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ENOUGH TO HANG YOUR HAT ON:
REGULATING BINDING ARBITRATION OF
INSURANCE DISPUTES IN TEXAS
By: Timothy Azevedo†
ABSTRACT
Texas law is currently silent on the issue of whether insurance companies
may sell insurance policies that require policyholders to bring coverage dis-
putes to an arbitrator rather than the courts. As incentives increase for insur-
ance companies to avoid costly litigation and for consumers to cut ever-
increasing premiums, this creates a situation where a hasty, ill-considered pro-
posal to allow such policy terms could shake the insurance market and public
policy in the state for years to come. Rather than taking a reactive position, the
Texas legislature should work with the Department of Insurance and stake-
holders to affirmatively decide: (1) whether to allow such policies at all and, if
so, (2) to create a robust legal framework that companies and consumers can
both benefit from and rely upon. Other countries, such as the United King-
dom, have well-established frameworks in place that can be instructive, as
University of Minnesota Law School professor Daniel Schwarcz has argued.
Ultimately though, Texas must determine for itself what policy will suit such a
vast and diverse state, particularly given its extreme weather.
Texas should consider establishing an independent body to assist in insur-
ance dispute resolution and to promote transparency. This Comment lays out
the case for doing so: better outcomes, better insurance, and better access to
justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]nsurance conceives justice according to a conception of sharing
for which it undertakes to fix equitable rules. . . . It constitutes a
mode of association which allows its participants to agree on the
rule of justice they will subscribe to. Insurance makes it possible to
dream of a contractual justice.1
Perhaps due to a harmony between this “contractual justice,” so ba-
sic to the concept of insurance as the French philosopher François
Ewald explained, and the related idea of contracting in advance to
resolve disputes through arbitration, insurance arbitration agreements
have become an issue of the day, particularly in Texas. Indeed, in
2016, a major insurer in the state made just such a proposal to add a
binding arbitration clause to some of its policies. Because the insurer
ultimately withdrew the proposal, the state’s insurance regulator
never ruled on the controversial issue. This gap leaves open the possi-
bility for important changes in this area on the horizon. Consequently,
government, insurance companies, consumers, and other stakeholders
must develop a better understanding of the options available to Texas,
one informed not only by Texas’s own unique circumstances, but also
by how other states and nations have acted on these kinds of arbitra-
tion agreements.
This Comment will discuss the legislative and judicial background
of arbitration agreements in Section II at both the federal and state
levels in the specific context of insurance. The primary focus of the
Comment, however, is on Texas property-casualty insurance policies.
Section III uses a comparative analysis discusses how the issue has
been treated overseas and in other types of insurance. Section IV
evaluates the unique strengths and concerns around arbitration in the
insurance business. Given that the current legislative framework (as
discussed in Section II) gives states heightened authority to regulate
insurance arbitration, the focus of this Comment is not so much an
academic inquiry into the relative merits of arbitration compared to
litigation, but rather a practical consideration of how a state can best
fulfill its regulatory role to maximize its strengths and minimize its
weaknesses. Accordingly, in Section V, this Comment will make spe-
cific recommendations about how Texas can design an efficient arbi-
tration solution that promotes important public interests that can
benefit both policyholders and the insurance industry.
1. FRANÇOIS EWALD, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197, 207
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Framework for Arbitration and Insurance in the U.S.
Arbitration is defined as “[a] process by which parties consensually
submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by
or for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute in
accordance with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording each party
an opportunity to present its case.”2 At common law, courts generally
disfavored arbitration agreements.3 In 1925, Congress intervened in
order to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements,” and passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).4 This
Act was a turning point not only in the acceptance of arbitration as a
means to resolve disputes, but arguably the beginning of a “national
policy favoring arbitration.”5 While initially limited in its application,
a series of Supreme Court decisions has expanded its impact. Particu-
larly important was Southland Corp. v. Keating, which held that the
FAA applied not only in federal court, but also in state courts where
the overwhelming majority of civil litigation actually takes place.6 In
other decisions, the FAA has been held to preempt state laws that
purport to ban or even curb arbitration agreements.7 Practically
speaking, the Act and subsequent Court decisions have resulted in a
historic proliferation of arbitration clauses in contracts of all kinds,
including insurance policies.8
In the insurance industry, however, there is an important legislative
caveat. In 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that the insurance industry,
previously only subject to state regulation, fell under Congress’s au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce under the U.S. Constitution.9
The following year, in 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act as a legislative response in which Congress essentially determined
that it did not actually intend to regulate insurance. The law provides
that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance . . . .”10 Thus the McCarran-Ferguson Act pre-
2. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2d ed.
2016).
3. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000).
4. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
5. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
6. Id. at 15-16.
7. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (preempting
state law invalidating predispute arbitration agreements); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (preempting state law mandating special notice
requirements for arbitration agreements).
8. Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemp-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 256–57 (2005).
9. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-561 (1944).
10. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1947) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR301.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-APR-19 14:08
104 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
vents federal laws and regulations of general applicability from pre-
empting insurance-specific state laws and regulations that meet the
following elements: (1) A federal law must invalidate, impair, or su-
persede a state law; (2) the state law at issue must have been enacted
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; and (3) the
federal law at issue must not specifically relate to the business of in-
surance.11 Because Congress has generally declined to exercise its
power to make laws that specifically regulate the business of insur-
ance, under McCarran-Ferguson, insurance is decisively regulated at
the state level (though of course it goes without saying that Congress
could simply pass another law to repeal McCarran-Ferguson). Conse-
quently, the existing diversity of state laws can result in a patchwork
of varying policies regarding arbitration in insurance, notwithstanding
the FAA. On the other hand, when the parties are not entirely domes-
tic, some courts have upheld international arbitration agreements
under the New York Convention.12 This is beyond the scope of this
Comment, however, which is limited to United States insurance poli-
cies written in accordance with Texas insurance laws.
B. Legal and Factual Background of Insurance Arbitration
in Texas
In 2016, a major Texas insurer, Texas Farm Bureau, submitted an
endorsement (a modification to the general insurance policy) contain-
ing arbitration provisions to the state insurance regulator for ap-
proval.13 The type of arbitration at issue was (1) mandatory, meaning
that it was the required method for dispute resolution if the parties
could not reach a voluntary agreement; (2) pre-dispute, meaning that
the parties decided to submit disputes to arbitration at the time the
company wrote the policy, rather than after a claim or dispute arose;
and (3) binding, meaning that the decision resulting from the arbitra-
tion process is enforceable by law. Ultimately, Texas Farm Bureau
withdrew the proposal from consideration after a hearing.14 Although
the insurance company spokesperson declined to comment further on
the matter, other than confirming that the proposal was withdrawn,
the proposal came under significant fire from plaintiff attorneys and
consumer groups.15 Under this proposal, policyholders had the option
to give up their right to sue in court in favor of binding arbitration; in
return, they would receive a discounted rate.16 The proposal was con-
11. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 501 (1993).
12. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 07–CV–1071, 2007
WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sep. 20, 2007).
13. See Jim Malewitz, Texas Insurer Drops Push to Let Homeowners Forgo Right
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troversial, with consumer advocates fighting the insurance industry
over whether the Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”) should ap-
prove it or not.17 For now, Texas property-casualty insurance policies
do not include any such mandatory arbitration agreements,18 though
there is an important exception discussed in Section III below. It is not
unreasonable to assume, however, that similar proposals will recur in
the future as Texas law remains silent on the issue—neither prohibit-
ing nor restricting arbitration clauses in insurance policies19—as dis-
cussed further in subsection C.
Costly insurance is nothing new in Texas, creating incentives for
both consumers and companies to cut costs. According to the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, the state’s extreme weather
has made insurance premiums in Texas the third-most expensive
among all states, behind only Florida and Louisiana.20 Although the
state suffers from a number of natural disasters including tornadoes,
wildfires, and hurricanes, the single most expensive problem for Texas
property owners is hail storms.21 The state’s weather often produces
hail stones of a “Texas-sized” variety: a volley of baseball-sized hail
can tear through roofs and windows, damaging property over a wide
area.22 According to TDI figures, hail storms caused some $10.4 bil-
lion in damage to homes between 1999 and 2011—a sum greater than
the combined total for hurricanes, thunderstorms, and tornadoes.23
Moreover, rapidly increasing litigation costs continue to create in-
centives for insurance companies to reduce their exposure to legal ex-
penses specifically. Data collected by TDI indicates that prior to 2012,
policyholders sued their insurer in about 0.1% of claims.24 For
2012–2015, the policyholder-insurer lawsuit rate was between 1.5%
and 2%, an increase of 1,400% to 1,900%.25 Furthermore, although
South Texas only accounts for a small minority of policies written
statewide, the region accounted for 56.2% of all claims involving law-
suits between 2010 and 2015.26 Insurance industry representatives
claim that much of the uptick in lawsuits stems from two especially
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. State Laws Regulating Arbitration in Insurance Contracts, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/article/state-laws-regulating-arbitration-insurance-contracts-0
[https://perma.cc/LU7E-H4D7] (last visited Aug. 29, 2018).
20. Lauren Etter, Attorneys, Insurers Facing Off over Hail Litigation in Texas, INS.





24. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., FINAL PRESENTATION TO THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE, IN-
TERIM CHARGES: THE COST OF WEATHER-RELATED PROPERTY CLAIMS AND RE-
LATED LITIGATION 10 (2017), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/documents/weather
relatedpropertyclaims.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8LM-5F9W].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 12.
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powerful hail storms that hit South Texas in 2012—along with the at-
torneys who followed behind the storms, advising policyholders to
sue.27 Thus insurers have a strong incentive to lower their litigation
costs and pass reductions of 10–25% to policyholders, particularly in
South Texas.28
Attempts to cut down on litigation expenses related to insurance is
not a new one in Texas either. Under multiple Republican governors,
promising to curb so-called “junk lawsuits,” tort reforms have been
enacted to make it harder to sue and recover for injuries.29 Tort re-
form affects litigants who want to sue under someone else’s insurance
coverage. However the Texas legislature has also stepped into con-
tract law, making it more difficult for policyholders to sue their own
insurance company.30 Under House Bill 1774, policyholders must
meet a notice requirement of sixty-one days before filing a lawsuit
against their insurer, may not be able to prevent removal of the suit to
federal court under diversity jurisdiction by suing an agent or adjuster
in addition to the insurance company, and may potentially face limits
to recovery for delayed claim payment penalties.31 It would appear
that the Texas legislature has already taken steps to assist insurance
companies seeking to reduce their litigation expense.
Ultimately however, economic pressures (including the need for af-
fordable yet adequately-priced insurance coverage) must be carefully
balanced in view of the rights at stake for policyholders, including the
right to jury trial guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.32 In this re-
spect, the Texas Farm Bureau proposal overreached, as discussed fur-
ther in Section IV. In its proposed arbitration clause, the insurance
company not only preselected the company providing arbitration ser-
vices, but was also the only party providing payment.33 This structure
potentially raises questions of independence and impartiality on the
part of the arbitrator.
The clause also limited discovery to a pre-determined set of docu-
ments.34 While this cuts down on the time and expense of “fishing
expeditions” for information that is not relevant to the present dis-
pute, it also cuts out the possibility of case-by-case determinations that
27. See Etter, supra note 20.
28. Arbitration Clause Made Public. It’s As Bad As We Thought, TEX. WATCH
(June 1, 2016), http://www.texaswatch.org/blog/arbitration-clause-made-public-its-
bad-we-thought [https://perma.cc/NB6W-AAV5].
29. Id.
30. Deborah Vennos, New Texas Insurance Code Chapter 542A, Effective Septem-
ber 1, 2017, May Reduce The Number of Harvey Lawsuits, PROP. INS. COVERAGE




32. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
33. TEX. WATCH, supra note 28.
34. Id.
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might argue in favor of going beyond the typical discovery needs. It
also provided for strict secrecy as to the result by both parties and the
arbitrator.35 This process makes the fairness of the system overall dif-
ficult to monitor, and it becomes impossible to set precedents for
novel issues that may arise under arbitration. Under this proposal, in
order to take advantage of the discount, consumers, regardless of their
sophistication or lack thereof, needed to make substantial legal con-
cessions before knowing precisely how it would impact any claim or
dispute that might arise in the future. In sum, these provisions poten-
tially undermine the system’s benefits by placing burdens on its utility,
fairness, and transparency.
C. State Laws Governing Insurance Arbitration
As mentioned previously, Texas has no statute or regulation in force
that prohibits mandatory arbitration.36 In this regard, Texas is among
a plurality of twenty-four states having no law or regulation regarding
arbitration in insurance policies.37 Because there is no law in these
states that specifically prohibits or restricts arbitration in insurance
policies (refer to Section II above), in theory the insurance policies in
those states could legally include mandatory arbitration clauses
(though insurance forms and rates must generally also be approved by
a state regulator). Indeed, arguably, the FAA (which favors upholding
such arbitration agreements) may apply to insurance policies in these
states because there is no state law in place for the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act to protect from federal preemption.
Sixteen other states currently prohibit the use of arbitration agree-
ments in insurance policies by statute.38 In spite of the presence of the
state statutes however, there is legal precedent in three of those states
holding that the arbitration clauses were enforceable anyway.39 The
purpose behind these anti-arbitration statutes was a concern on the
part of state legislatures that insurance companies would set the terms
of a private arbitration process that was contrary to public policy
(echoing the common law position set out in Section II above), plac-
ing policyholders at a disadvantage.40 Another seven states have stat-
utes that restrict arbitration clauses only under certain circumstances,
such as allegations of bad faith or allowing only non-binding
arbitration.41
35. Id.




40. Mark J. Bunim, When States Prohibit Dispute Resolution: The Use of
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Insurance Policies, 71 DISP. RESOL. J. 47, 50 (2016).
41. Id. at 56–57.
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As can be seen by the assortment of state laws, one advantage of
the federal system of government is that it allows for a real-world lab-
oratory of different approaches in the various states. As such, states
can experiment with ways to supplement their courts with specialized
systems for resolving insurance disputes. Some of these alternative
dispute resolution (“ADR”) systems already exist and can produce
beneficial results, as discussed in subsection D. This Comment will ex-
plore how states like Texas could provide leadership in this space by
adopting a mandatory arbitration option that serves the interests of
both insurance companies and their customers.
D. Existing Ability to Resolve Disputes Outside Court
It is important to note that in the current context, policyholders and
insurance companies already have the option to resolve disputes
outside of court after they arise. One such option is mediation. No
state has a statute prohibiting mandatory mediation clauses.42 In me-
diation, even where both parties agree to submit their disputes to a
mediator, the process does not lead to a binding result absent the
agreement of both parties.43 In fact, many courts that hear insurance
cases encourage or mandate mediation before trial.44 Unlike binding
arbitration, if the litigants cannot resolve their differences, they still
remain free to pursue a remedy in court.45
Another option is a special type of arbitration provision known as
appraisal, which most property insurance policies have used for more
than a century.46 This ADR system is designed for resolution of dis-
putes over the amount of a given insured loss.47 A typical appraisal
clause looks like the following:
If we and you disagree on the value of the property or the amount
of the “loss,” either may make written demand for an appraisal of
the “loss.” In this event, each party will select a competent and im-
partial appraiser. You and we must notify the other of the appraiser
selected within twenty days of the written demand for appraisal.
The two appraisers will select an umpire. If the appraisers do not
agree on the selection of an umpire within 15 days, they must re-
quest selection of an umpire by a judge of a court having jurisdic-
tion. The appraisers will state separately the value of the property
and the amount of the “loss.” If they fail to agree, they will submit
their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will
be the appraised value of the property or amount of “loss.” If you
42. Id. at 47–48.
43. Id. at 48.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Robert H. Jerry II, Dispute Resolution, Insurance, and Points of Convergence,
2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 255, 271.
47. Id. at 273.
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make a written demand for an appraisal of the “loss,” each party
will:
a. Pay its chosen appraiser; and
b. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally.48
In summary, once invoked by written demand, each party selects an
appraiser to make an assessment of the amount of loss (the costs of
which are borne by each respective party), and together they agree
upon an umpire to decide the matter.49 Like arbitration, the umpire’s
decision results in a decision that is binding on both parties.50 But in
contrast to a true arbitration clause where the parties can contest the
policy’s coverage, the scope of appraisal is generally limited to deter-
mining the amount of damages.51 And like any insurance policy provi-
sion that gains widespread adoption, the appraisal process is of
tremendous consequence to a massive number of disputes. Even after
removing all the insurance claims that are resolved quickly and
smoothly, the appraisal process cumulatively affects the claim process
as the default option when parties are unable to agree on damages in
more than 10 million instances each and every year.52 Therefore to
prove viable, any pre-dispute arbitration solution must be adaptable
to the countless real-world applications of its provisions on a large
scale.
Finally, consumers may make a complaint to TDI. The department
assists with improper claim denials in addition to a wide variety of
other problems such as cancellations, customer service issues, cover-
age misrepresentations, discriminatory rate increases, fraud, etc.53
TDI contacts the insurance company asking for a detailed response,
decides if the issue was handled appropriately, and may take enforce-
ment action if necessary.54 This service is a substantial benefit to poli-
cyholders who are too busy or unfamiliar with insurance to act on
their own, as TDI does much of the work on their behalf, including
contacting the company. The process ensures that both parties have
the advantage of insurance expertise, as policyholders can benefit
from the knowledge of TDI staff. Because a third party goes between
the insurer and the insured, the process may also maintain goodwill
and business relationships that otherwise might not survive the direct
conflict usually involved in a protracted dispute, such as litigation. The
insurance company likely has a higher incentive to cooperate with
48. Johnny C. Parker, Understanding the Insurance Policy Appraisal Clause: A
Four-Step Program, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 931 (2006).
49. Jerry, supra note 46, at 272.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 272.
52. Id.
53. Insurance Complaint Process, TEX. DEP’T OF INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/
consumer/complfrm.html [https://perma.cc/UK9M-5WNG] (last visited Aug. 28,
2018).
54. Id.
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TDI in order to maintain a positive relationship with its regulator. Fi-
nally, the complaint system also has gravitas and some “teeth” backed
by regulatory powers that simply may not be present in a traditional
mediation setting. Nevertheless, state-sponsored complaint resolution
suffers from its own problems: lack of resources, low claim resolution
rates, and the impartiality concerns posed by the potential for regula-
tory capture.55 The next Section explores in greater detail the poten-
tial role of public entities.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. International
Regulators help resolve consumer disputes in the United Kingdom
through a “private ombudsman” system.56 While an ombudsman nor-
mally resolves disputes with a government agency, a private
ombudsman exists to facilitate resolution of private party disputes.57
The Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”), an independent public
entity which deals exclusively with consumer complaints against finan-
cial companies, administers the dispute resolution service.58 By blend-
ing a variety of private ADR methods with a regulatory conciliation
process under a single system, the FOS private ombudsman model of-
fers an ADR mechanism that could be emulated in the United
States—as it already has in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland,
India, and Japan.59
The FOS is involved in four basic stages of the dispute resolution
process: (1) internal complaint procedures, (2) a frontline call office,
(3) adjudicator conciliation, and (4) ombudsman review.60 In the first
stage, the policyholder is required to make a formal complaint with
their own insurer.61 Within eight weeks, the insurance company is re-
quired to send a written response which must inform the policyholder
of the right to petition the FOS and include an FOS pamphlet describ-
ing its services.62 The second stage, the frontline call office, essentially
plays a gatekeeper role: when a customer calls the FOS, the office
confirms that a complaint has been made to the insurer, assessing ju-
risdiction and timeliness.63 It will then collect the insurance company’s
own response to the complaint and assess a £450 fee to the insurer.64
55. Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of
the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV.
735, 737-38. (2009).
56. Id. at 738.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 738-39.
60. Id. at 770-71.
61. Id. at 771.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 772.
64. Id.
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The third stage, adjudicator conciliation, involves an official investi-
gation by an adjudicator (usually someone with a background in in-
dustry, the law, government, or ADR).65 While they do not have the
authority to issue a decision that is binding on the parties, they may
encourage settlements based on their view of the circumstances of the
complaint.66 They also have no regulatory authority, acting indepen-
dently from (though frequently also working with) the United King-
dom insurance regulator, the Financial Services Authority.67
The fourth and final step is the ombudsman review. Here, if the
parties have not already reached a settlement voluntarily in the previ-
ous stages, the ombudsman may make a final decision, awarding poli-
cyholders up to £100,000.68 Importantly, the decision is binding—
though only on the insurance company (with a limited right of ap-
peal). Policyholders may appeal as a matter of course, though the
ombudsman decision is admissible as evidence in court.69 Unlike adju-
dicators, ombudsmen do possess the power to issue binding decisions,
but neither possess any regulatory authority.70 The ombudsman posi-
tion itself is a high public office, involving not only resolving cases but
also acting as administrators by planning, monitoring, training, and
making policy for the FOS.71
A clever, quasi-judicial framework guides the FOS decision-making
process. FOS adjudicators and ombudsmen act in accordance with a
statutory “fair and reasonable” legal standard, which requires them to
consider factors including the “relevant law, regulations, regulators’
rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and, where appropriate,
what [FOS] considers to have been good industry practice at the rele-
vant time.“72 Importantly, ombudsmen are not bound by legal prece-
dent where doing so would not be in the interest of justice (though the
FOS must state both the correct law and its reasoning for the diver-
gence).73 Rather, the touchstone for the application of the “fair and
reasonable” standard to the facts of the case is the FOS’s own prior
decisions.74 These decisions operate as a kind of “FOS precedent”
that helps ensure that the use of a flexible standard can still result in
reasonably consistent decision making.75 If any facts are in dispute,
the adjudicator tries them according to “the balance of probability” of
available evidence for the purposes of his or her written case evalua-
65. Id. at 772-73.
66. Id. at 773.
67. Id. at 774.
68. Id. at 776.
69. Id. at 777.
70. Id. at 777 n.235.
71. Id. at 777.
72. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: COMPLAINTS § 1.6.2 (2008), http://
fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DISP/.
73. Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 778.
74. Id. at 775.
75. Id. at 778.
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tion.76 The adjudicator may review these factual findings on appeal
only for legal or procedural errors, or when they rise to the level of
being ”perverse and irrational.“77
An ombudsman may elect not to decide a dispute because it raises
difficult or novel legal issues, leaving it for the courts to decide on
their own.78 Additionally the accumulation of documents from each of
the prior stages constitutes a record that is available in its entirety to
the FOS at every consecutive stage.79 When there is a final
ombudsman decision on a case, the written opinion is abridged and
anonymized for publication in a recorder called the “Ombudsman
News.”80 These decisions, in turn, help to guide future decisions, as
discussed above. Crucially, this system allows for a measure of both
confidentiality (anonymity) and transparency (public disclosure).
While virtually every component on the private ombudsman system
is also present in one form or another in the United States, qualitative
differences do emerge. The most important difference is the FOS’s
proven track record of doing its job: resolving disputes.81 American
state regulators, such as TDI, achieve voluntary settlements in only a
minority of cases. The FOS, on the other hand, successfully facilitates
voluntary settlement (i.e. prior to the binding ombudsman review
stage) an impressive 94% of the time.82 Not only that, its “clients” are
highly satisfied. 88% of British insurance companies are “satisfied
with the relationship they have with the FOS,” and 70% of consumers
believe that the FOS ”handles complaints efficiently and profession-
ally.“83 While naturally there may be many explanations for the differ-
ence in resolution rates, it is worth considering whether Texas can
replicate some of FOS’s best practices. Section IV explores this topic
in greater detail.
The European Union has also acted on insurance dispute resolu-
tion. In 2016, EU Online Dispute Resolution regulations took effect,
requiring member states to certify ADR entities that are capable of
receiving and resolving complaints online (and offline), as well as their
compliance with the EU’s procedural safeguards.84 It further requires
the European Commission to operate an online ADR platform that
works with the nationally-certified ADR entities.85 The headline on its
website claims: “Resolve your online consumer problem fairly and ef-
76. Id. at 776.
77. Id. at 778.
78. Id. at 778-79.
79. Id. at 777.
80. Id. at 779.
81. Id. at 783.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 784.
84. Ramona L. Lampley, The CFPB Anti-Arbitration Proposal: Let’s Just Give
Arbitration a Chance, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 313, 337 (2016).
85. Id. at 338.
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ficiently without going to court.”86 It is not mandatory to use these
systems, but through these regulations the EU has ensured that mod-
ern, low-cost, and accessible dispute resolution options are available
to industry and consumers alike.87 Perhaps the greatest advantage of
these online systems is their scale. As more users take advantage of
these online platforms, operating costs and timeframes could signifi-
cantly improve in comparison to traditional paper and phone systems,
providing for better redress of high-volume, low-value disputes.88 Sim-
ilar investment in efficient, tech-savvy solutions can help states like
Texas to cut wait times, cut costs, and close the access-to-justice gap
that often frustrates attempts to resolve disputes through litigation.
B. Domestic
A 2011 Texas statute currently allows consumers purchasing insur-
ance through the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (“TWIA”),
a state-created wind and hailstorm insurer for high-risk property on
the Texas coast, to choose a binding arbitration endorsement.89 Once
selected, the consumer “must arbitrate a dispute involving an act, rul-
ing, or decision of the association relating to the payment of, the
amount of, or the denial of the claim.”90 It follows that the Texas legis-
lature has already recognized the utility (or at least necessity) of these
clauses in connection with the South Texas coastal properties that
carry the highest risk of storm damage (and for which it could poten-
tially be forced to foot the bill). On the other hand, the accountability
of the state to its customers through the democratic process provides
safeguards that are not present for private, commercial enterprises.
This observation reaffirms the importance of accountability in any ar-
bitration policy solution.
In July 2018, Williamson County and Travis County justice courts in
Texas began using an online dispute resolution platform called
“Modria Online Dispute Resolution Solution.”91 The system
originated as an automated dispute resolution system designed for
eBay and PayPal, which successfully resolves some 90% of claims re-
ceived, and was modified by Tyler Technologies, a Texas-based com-
pany, for use in the justice system.92 Litigants will pay a $15 fee to
86. Online Dispute Resolution, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/
main/index.cfm?event=main.home2.show&lng=EN [https://perma.cc/589M-4A3M]
(last visited Aug. 29, 2018).
87. Lampley, supra note 84, at 337.
88. See id. at 338.
89. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2210.554 (West 2011).
90. Id.
91. Claire Osborn and Taylor Goldenstein, Area Judges Make Plans to Try Out
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mediate their claim online, and officials expect that it will save time
and money compared to traditional methods.93 Bill Gravell, Justice of
the Peace in Williamson County, labeled it “pajama justice” because
of the convenience of settling a lawsuit even from one’s home.94 In-
stead of waiting forty-five days for a court hearing, the dispute resolu-
tion process can begin immediately.95 After opting to use the system,
Tyler Technologies will email the plaintiff and defendant with their
login information.96 The litigants then enter information about the is-
sues in the case, decide what solutions they are seeking, and may se-
lect from a range of responses.97 This system allows for a
sophisticated, automated solution that can be responsive to the many
factors, including psychological ones, that underlie dispute resolution.
“A lot of people are OK with getting less money than they want out of
the case as long as the other person apologizes,” according to a gen-
eral manager for the program.98 If the online dispute resolution is un-
successful, the litigants can proceed with traditional mediation or in
court.99 Above all, this system illustrates that local government offi-
cials in Texas have attempted to use technology to improve the experi-
ence of dispute resolution while also lowering costs. There is no
reason that state agencies, a private ombudsman, or the insurance in-
dustry in Texas could not follow this example.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION
IN INSURANCE
A. Advantages
As a threshold issue, states like Texas must first determine whether
they should permit pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the first
place. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the potential dis-
advantages outweigh the potential advantages, such that Texas should
restrict or prohibit the agreements altogether as a matter of policy.
Arbitration as a means of dispute resolution generally can provide a
number of advantages, including autonomy, flexibility, neutrality, con-
fidentiality, expertise, relative efficiency, and preservation of
relationships.
Arbitration can promote autonomy because in theory it allows the
parties involved to determine for themselves the choice of law and








100. Peter A. Halprin, Arbitration in Insurance Coverage Disputes: Pluses and Mi-
nuses, POLICYHOLDER ADVISOR, Nov.–Dec. 2014, at 1.
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cannot generally negotiate insurance policies on a case-by-case basis,
given that regulators must approve the forms in advance, reduces this
advantage. To the extent that the insurance market as a whole allows
consumers to choose among different options, however, there is still
some degree of choice and autonomy. In this vein, an option to select
arbitration at the time the insured purchases a policy (with appropri-
ate transparency requirements to ensure consumers understand their
choice) promotes greater consumer choice.
Arbitration is also flexible because it need not follow the complex
rules of procedure that must be broad enough to encompass the vari-
ous types of civil litigation, rather the procedure can be tailor to the
subject matter and the needs of each individual case. Arbitration can
also avoid concern about local bias when one litigant is at home in a
given forum and the other is an outsider.101 Confidentiality can also be
an advantage in arbitration,102 where parties may not wish to have
their business practices made available via discovery to the general
public (and competitors). In the insurance business, maintaining confi-
dentiality is perhaps especially important: success in the insurance in-
dustry is premised on building a competitive advantage through
proprietary information.103 Expertise can also present an advantage in
arbitration. An arbitrator selected for having subject matter expertise
and experience may know more than a judge who is a generalist, to
say nothing of a jury that may not know anything about insurance at
all. Consequently, the arbitrator may render a more informed judg-
ment and may not need briefing on industry specifics.
Cost and speed are perceived advantages of arbitration.104 Less for-
mal procedures and fewer costs present an opportunity to resolve con-
flicts faster and cheaper than in court. In the context of insurance
claims in Texas, only a small percentage of disputes are resolved in
court,105 and others may go unresolved entirely as a result. Litigation
in court is frequently slow, expensive, and unpredictable. Plaintiffs in
insurance coverage cases have necessarily suffered some kind of loss
and as a result usually need quick compensation. Compared to other
cases, these plaintiffs may be even shorter on the financial and per-
sonal resources that litigation often requires, and they are generally
more risk-averse (having already paid for insurance to transfer the
risk in the first place).106 In such situations, slow and costly justice can
block access to justice entirely. Even where counsel is available and
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.
103. See EWALD, supra note 1, at 203 (“Risk only becomes calculable when it is
spread over a population. The work of the insurer is, precisely, to constitute that pop-
ulation by selecting and dividing risks.”).
104. Halprin, supra note 100, at 2.
105. Only a single-digit percentage of claims result in litigation. See TEX. DEP’T OF
INS., supra note 24, at 10.
106. Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 742.
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willing to take cases on a contingency fee basis, reducing the policy-
holder’s immediate concern for cost, speed still remains an important
issue. To the extent arbitration offers faster resolution, while still of-
fering a fair hearing of the dispute, it remains possible to improve
plaintiffs’ access to justice.
Additionally, because the insurance transaction is a sequential ex-
change (with the policyholder paying premium in advance and later
collecting if and when some future condition occurs—unlike the typi-
cal sales transaction where the exchange is simultaneous), it is to the
insurance company’s advantage and the policyholder’s detriment to
delay payment of the claim as long as possible. Further, when arbitra-
tion results in a speedy resolution, it may also allow for parties to
maintain business relationships that otherwise might not survive pro-
tracted litigation.107
One alternative to arbitration that can offer similar advantages—
namely class-action lawsuits—frequently chosen by consumers in
other contexts to litigate high-volume but low-value claims, is rarely a
realistic option in insurance disputes. Insurance claims are highly fact-
sensitive, concerned with the situation of a particular policyholder at a
particular place and time that gave rise to a claim under a particular
policy. As such, these cases usually do not share enough common is-
sues to effectively aggregate them in a class-action suit.108 The insur-
ance-related class-action suits that do arise are usually not related to
claims.109 Consequently, class actions, which provide an efficient,
mass-litigation alternative to arbitration generally, do not provide a
viable alternative in the context of insurance disputes.
B. Disadvantages
While arbitration potentially has many advantages, the same fea-
tures could also be considered disadvantages. Among these are the
potential for waiver of rights, secrecy, lack of fairness, and asymmetri-
cal power. As discussed previously, binding arbitration, while provid-
ing additional options to contracting parties, may also involve waiving
a constitutional right to a jury trial110 as part of that choice, something
that a party should not take lightly. Further, the flexibility and speed
of arbitration means that parties may have an informal and abbrevi-
ated trial that abrogates rights to procedural fairness they are other-
wise entitled to under the more complex and lengthy rules of civil
procedure.
Confidentiality might also create a concern for secrecy. If the arbi-
tration is completely confidential, then there is no public record of
107. Id.
108. Id. at 749.
109. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and
Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L. 2, Oct. 2007, at 17.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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opinions, no way to create or recognize precedent from these proceed-
ings, and no way to ensure that the results are just. It may also conflict
with the public policy recognized in the Texas Constitution’s provision
of a right to open courts.111 Secrecy may also protect abusive business
practices from scrutiny.112 Arbitration can disguise the inequalities
that may result from incentives to favor repeat players.113 In the insur-
ance context, the insurance company is usually the repeat player.
While arbitrators may never see a policyholder again, they may need
to compete for the business of the insurer.114 Consequently, a desire
to obtain more of their business may give arbitrators an incentive to
rule in favor of the insurers.
Arbitration agreements may also provide unfair advantages. While
flexibility allows an arbitration to proceed quickly and simply, that
flexibility may also limit discovery.115 This result most often advan-
tages the party possessing more information—here the insurance com-
pany.116 Additionally, it is the plaintiff (usually the policyholder given
the sequential nature of the insurance transaction discussed above)
who bears the burden of proof for all the necessary elements to make
out a claim. Consequently, limited discovery inures to the advantage
of the defendant (usually the insurance company).
The finality of arbitration also raises a fairness issue. While arbitra-
tors should apply the law, there are no guarantees that they will do so
without error, and there is no possibility of appeal for failure to apply
the law correctly.117 Even arbitrators’ expertise can result in unfair-
ness to the extent that such expertise usually arises from experience
gained through employment in the insurance industry and could result
in a bias towards that industry.118
Asymmetry of sophistication between parties also presents an en-
during critique of arbitration. Specifically, in the insurance context,
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, meaning that the insur-
ance company drafts them, and they are not usually negotiable (al-
though regulators must normally approve the language first). If
insurance companies may draft their own arbitration clauses, it could
lead some companies “rigging the system” in their favor as much as
possible. Arbitration may already be stacked against unsophisticated
consumers. A study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has
shown that consumers rarely succeed in arbitration for disputes with
111. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
112. Randall, supra note 8, at 258.
113. Id. at 258-59.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 258.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 261
118. Id. at 259.
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(non-insurance) financial companies.119 Out of 1,060 arbitration cases
tracked from 2010 to 2011, consumers only prevailed in thirty-two
cases.120 Finally, by taking courts out of the equation, arbitration may
effectively remove an important regulator of the insurance industry.121
As Robert E. Keeton and Alan Widiss noted, “the influence of the
courts on insurance transactions through doctrinal developments has
sometimes been considerably more significant than the enforcement
of regulatory measures by the commissioner of insurance.”122
V. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE INSURANCE ARBITRATION IN TEXAS
As previously discussed in the preceding section, while arbitration is
promising with respect to the advantages it offers, it is burdened by
many potential disadvantages as well. A well-designed dispute resolu-
tion scheme, however, may mitigate many of these disadvantages. A
new, robust emphasis on transparency by the Texas Department of
Insurance; creation of an independent public entity (similar to the
British FOS); pre-dispute arbitration agreement language that bal-
ances the interests of insurers and policyholders; and greater leverage
of technology can allow Texas to borrow from the best practices of
other countries and potentially minimize the disadvantages to con-
sumers and society of binding arbitration. Lower cost and the availa-
bility of a consumer conciliation process can improve access to justice,
which is at the heart of the right to trial. Courts, however, may con-
tinue playing an important role by settling the novel legal issues which
often arise in insurance cases.
All of these proposals presuppose a great deal of new regulation
and oversight. While Texas is not a state known for being overly
friendly to regulation, insurance is already a highly-regulated industry.
Having a heavily-regulated industry function better is something even
wary Texas legislators can appreciate. Furthermore, a private ombuds-
man, similar to the FOS, would actually allow for less government in-
volvement than the present TDI complaint system.
Perhaps the most significant political hurdle is persuading the insur-
ance lobby to buy into (or at least acquiescence to) a new system.
Here, the British have shown that it is possible to create a dispute
resolution service that is popular with industry.123 A non-partisan, in-
dependent body that simply assists in claim resolution may even make
119. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015), at 12, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb
_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94G-QFCW].
120. Id.
121. Id. at 263.
122. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 8.1, at 938
(1988).
123. Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 810.
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the claim department’s job easier. Part of the reason the FOS works
well is that its independence helps in its task of managing consumer
expectations and explaining adverse coverage decisions because FOS
has no direct stake in the issue.124 Indeed, in the United Kingdom, the
insurance industry actually introduced the FOS, private ombudsman
approach.125 To the extent that the insurance industry tends to dislike
change, Texas can sweeten the deal for insurers by providing addi-
tional incentives, such as offering partial relief from bad-faith claims
or prompt-payment penalties if they agree to participate in the
system.126
A private solution also offers insurance companies the prospect of
avoiding additional state or even federal involvement. If pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are allowed and subsequently abused by bad
actors, it raises the specter of regulation that might be a less friendly
to business than a voluntary, private arrangement. Therefore, the in-
surance industry has an interest in a fair and workable regulatory
system.
The other reason this system may be preferable for the state of
Texas is to maintain state independence and avoid possible federal
involvement. Currently, Texas can decide whether and how to regu-
late the insurance industry. Texans generally tend to pride themselves
on managing their own affairs, and they greatly value their indepen-
dence. Certainly, maintaining the state’s prerogative and influence is a
priority. Historically, in fact, the threat of federal preemption has
probably resulted in more state insurance regulatory reform than any
other single factor.127 For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by
limiting the states’ exemption if they did not regulate insurance them-
selves, resulted in the creation of state insurance regulatory law.128
While the FAA presently has a carve out for state regulation of insur-
ance under McCarran-Ferguson (as discussed in Section II), depend-
ing on the prevailing politics in Washington, if states are seen as either
unfairly obstructing arbitration agreements (contrary to the general
policy of the FAA) or as allowing arbitration on terms that are too
favorable to the insurance industry (and therefore unfavorable to con-
sumers), Congress could very well intervene and change the law. In
the former scenario, the McCarran-Ferguson Act could be repealed,
the FAA would be the law of the land in every state, and a public
policy favoring arbitration would uphold arbitration agreements in the
insurance industry too. Under the latter scenario, the federal govern-
ment might feel compelled to oversee the state regulators or even di-
124. Id. at 810-811.
125. Id. at 811.
126. Id.
127. Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Trans-
parency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 457 (2014).
128. Id.
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rectly regulate itself. If there is one thing the Texas legislature would
prefer to avoid, in a state with no great love of Washington bureau-
crats, it is to have the federal government involved in the state insur-
ance industry.
On the other hand, it is worth considering some of the differences
between the United Kingdom and Texas which may make the imple-
mentation of a FOS-like scheme problematic. One meaningful barrier
is simply building up the institutional knowledge and capacity for a
dispute resolution body comparable to FOS. While TDI has a com-
plaint resolution department, and there are knowledgeable individuals
who already work as arbitrators, it will still take an investment of time
and money to build an institution from scratch. The insurance industry
may also balk at the British approach of rulings that are only binding
on insurance companies and not policyholders. One possible reason is
that the greater availability of punitive damages in the United
States129 (which can be much greater than the underlying contract
claim) may incentivize policyholders with an unfavorable ruling to cal-
culate that it is worthwhile to re-litigate the claim in court, upsetting
the rationale of the system.
Another reason is cultural. Texans simply may not be inclined to
give up some familiar and historically-rooted rights to bring claims in
court in favor of an unfamiliar and bureaucratic system borrowed
from a foreign country. Nevertheless, Texans are also deeply prag-
matic, possessing a powerful capacity to borrow and put their own
stamp on things. And to the pragmatist, the most important question
is whether something works well or not. An arbitration system that
can stand on its own merits is its own most persuasive argument.
Texas’s size may play a role in its ability to make investments
needed to create a workable regulatory system. The sheer size of the
state and its insurance market (and the taxes that come from payment
of insurance premiums) means that Texas simply has greater resources
available to experiment with creating a new regulatory framework
than most states. Additionally, Texas could invest in an alternative dis-
pute resolution platform similar to those developed in the European
Union. As part of that investment, greater use of technology, either
through direct investment by the state (or by the creation of incentives
for the state’s substantial technology sector) can also lower the cost to
resolve disputes, which benefits all parties involved. It may also lower
barriers to access the Texas insurance market, as insurers will not have
to develop their own proprietary systems, which could promote com-
petition and make insurance less expensive for consumers.
Another important area of opportunity is in promoting trans-
parency. Transparency can alleviate concerns about arbitration by
helping customers help themselves in order to better understand their
129. Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 782.
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insurance coverage and avoid disputes in the first place. Transparency
has historically been a neglected area for state insurance regulators.130
By comparison, developing more transparent markets is a cornerstone
in other areas of modern financial regulation.131 Transparency, by
making available better information, can help Texas deliver on goals
of fair and efficient markets at lower cost. It also empowers interested
parties, consumer advocates, and journalists to play a watchdog role
(at no cost to the state coffers) that supplements state regulatory
efforts.132
Courts, however, can still play an important role in insurance law by
stepping in when novel or complex legal issues arise in insurance cases
that are beyond the private ombudsman system. This avoids one im-
portant problem of secrecy in arbitration. Similar to the FOS system,
an ombudsman may choose not to decide a dispute, leaving courts to
decide difficult or novel legal issues. A limited right to appeal may
also preserve the perception of fairness in the system. Where courts
do become involved on appeal, the record and documents generated
by the private dispute resolution system could be invaluable in quick-
ening the discovery process and resolving cases quickly.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment offers a variety of recommendations for how Texas
can design and promote a low-cost, efficient arbitration solution that
can be mutually advantageous to insurance companies, policyholders,
and society. The following methods may provide the means for Texas
to play a leadership role in insurance markets while avoiding greater
state and federal regulation: (1) a greater emphasis on transparency
by TDI; (2) the creation of an independent dispute resolution body;
(3) use of the British private ombudsman system as a model; (4)
greater leverage of technology; and (5) leaving a role for the judiciary
on novel and complex cases. It would enable the advantages of arbi-
tration in insurance, which are autonomy, flexibility, neutrality, confi-
dentiality, expertise, relative cost and speed, and preservation of
business relationships. At the same time, it would help in alleviating
concerns about the waiver of rights, secrecy, lack of fairness, and
asymmetrical power involved in such agreements. In short, it might be
“enough to hang your hat on.”
130. Schwarcz, supra note 127, at 396.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 398-99.
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